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ABSTRACT 
 
The NHS Plan, published in July 2000, presented an ambitious blueprint for the 
transformation of the way the NHS delivers health care.  The backdrop to the Plan is the 
substantial increase in resources for the NHS promised for the next 5 years.  At the heart of 
the Plan is the aim of ensuring these resources are used effectively to provide a health service 
“designed around the patient”. 
 
After reviewing the perceived flaws in the current system and dismissing the notion of 
alternative systems of health care funding, the main part of the Plan outlines the strategy for 
tackling the shortcomings.  The discussion is wide-ranging and includes not only those areas 
we would expect to see covered, such as the interface between health and social care and the 
performance management system, but also issues such as investment in infrastructure, the 
relationships between the NHS and the private sector and key personnel issues such as the 
supply of health care professionals and their contractual arrangements. 
 
This discussion paper summarises the main elements of the Plan before focusing more closely 
on seven key themes on which economic analysis has a distinctive insight to offer – 
investment, information, labour markets, the independent sector, waiting times, performance 
management, and patient and carer responses.  Some of the preconditions for success of the 
Plan are outlined and gaps in the available evidence to support various aspects of the Plan are 
highlighted.  Our conclusions suggest that there is reason to be optimistic that the Plan will 
deliver many of its lofty aspirations if two key conditions are met.  First, that front-line staff 
are on board and have the resources and the will to help implement the Plan; and second, that 
political expediency and the desire to achieve short-term goals does not drive out the 
commitment to the long-term aims for the NHS. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Amongst many other connotations, the Oxford Dictionary defines a plan as a 
‘formulated or organized method by which a thing is to be done’ or ‘a way of 
proceeding’.  The construction of a plan implies a desire to prescribe actions and to 
shape the world in a purposive fashion.  The concept of planning is unfashionable.  It 
achieved its apogee in the Soviet economic system, and the breakdown of the Soviet 
experiment is often ascribed to the failure of planning.  It is conventional to contrast 
the planning model of social organization with the use of markets as a basis for 
economic exchange.  In this respect, economic theories of industrial organization, as 
put forward by authors such as Williamson and Ouchi, offer important frameworks for 
analysing the purpose and role of planning.  Loosely speaking, planning is a process 
used by hierarchies (as opposed to markets) to organize their activities.  
 
The NHS is one of the largest hierarchies in the world, and so there is good reason to 
believe that planning has an important role to play in its management.  The NHS has 
indeed sought to give the appearance of a planned organization.  The central 
executive has always promulgated central policy to local managers through guidelines 
and  instructions, in what was termed a planning process.  Even when in 1991 the 
‘internal market’ experiment was introduced into the NHS, in an attempt to mimic the 
functioning of a conventional market within the organization, the stream of central 
directives and guidance remained unstaunched.  In short, the NHS exhibited all the 
rhetoric of a planned organization. 
 
Nevertheless, although the semblance of a planning process has always been in place, 
the reality has been that the NHS is a largely unplanned organization [1].  Managerial 
attention has traditionally been narrowly focused on inputs, in the form of manpower 
planning and cost control.  More recently, local management has also been 
encouraged to address waiting times for elective surgery.  However, the bureaucratic 
structures needed to direct attention towards broader issues, such as clinical quality, 
have never been in place.  There exists an extraordinary degree of local professional 
autonomy and many parts of the system have been barely touched by managerial 
concerns.  Indeed many managers would argue that hitherto they have deliberately 
sought to protect professionals from such concerns.  Thus the NHS planning process 
has in many respects represented the antithesis of a ‘plan’.   
 
Published in July 2000, The NHS Plan seeks to change that by setting out a broad 
central vision and putting in place numerous instruments designed to secure 
compliance [2].  The stimulus for the Plan is the enormous and sustained increase in 
resources promised for the NHS over a five year period.  This paper assesses the 
extent to which the measures set out in the Plan are likely to achieve their objectives.  
The next section summarizes the content of the Plan.  There then follows a discussion 
centring on seven key elements of the plan, which raises a number of issues that will 
need to be addressed as implementation of the Plan unfolds.  It is followed by a brief 
concluding section. 
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A SUMMARY OF THE NHS PLAN 
 
The Plan starts with a statement of ten ‘core principles’ which effectively set the 
strategic vision which the Plan seeks to make operational (see Table 1).  In principle 
the success of the Plan should be judged by its performance in relation to these 
principles, although it is difficult to see how such performance can in practice be 
measured.  The Plan proper then starts in earnest (Chapter 1) with an elaboration of 
the vision for the NHS: ‘a health service designed around the patient’. 
 
Table 1: The NHS Plan: ten core principles 
 
1.  The NHS will provide a universal service for all based on clinical need, not 
ability to pay 
2.  The NHS will provide a comprehensive range of services 
3.  The NHS will shape its services around the needs and preferences of individual 
patients, their families and their carers 
4.  The NHS will respond to different needs of different populations 
5.  The NHS will work continuously to improve quality services and to minimise 
errors  
6.  The NHS will support and value its staff  
7.  Public funds for healthcare will be devoted solely to NHS patients 
8.  The NHS will work together with others to ensure a seamless service for patients 
9.  The NHS will help keep people healthy and work to reduce health inequalities  
10. The NHS will respect the confidentiality of individual patients and provide open 
access to information about services, treatment and performance  
 
There follows an analysis of the current strengths and weaknesses of the NHS 
(Chapter 2).  The chapter claims that many of the traditional strengths of the NHS, 
such as fairness and value for money - remain intact.  However, it concedes that 
important weaknesses have developed which need to be addressed.  Prominent 
amongst these concerns are: 
 
−  serious inadequacies in staff numbers, morale and skills; 
−  long waiting times for care; 
−  lack of a patient focus; 
−  inadequate cooperation between professions and between services; 
−  poor physical infrastructure, cleanliness and catering; 
−  over centralization and excessive bureaucracy; 
−  variations in standards between areas. 
 
These issues are amongst the most important expressed by both the public and NHS 
staff as part of a large consultation process undertaken to inform the Plan.  The key 
conclusion is that the principles of the NHS remain as relevant as ever.  However, 
many of its practices are now outdated.  Furthermore, the NHS has suffered from 
chronic under-investment, in terms of personnel, training, equipment and physical 
infrastructure.  This diagnosis forms the main basis for the contents of the Plan. 
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Given the acknowledged weaknesses of the current NHS, the Plan next examines 
whether alternative systems of funding health care might now be appropriate (Chapter 
3).  It assesses options such as private insurance, social insurance and user charges 
against the two broad criteria of efficiency and equity.  The chapter argues very 
cogently (although unsurprisingly) that the current system of tax-based funding is not 
the cause of current NHS failures, and that any other system of funding may 
compromise important and popular principles of the NHS.  The chapter therefore 
reaffirms that the focus of attention should be the practices of the NHS, not its 
principles. 
 
The Plan proper then proceeds to set out the investment priorities for hospital and 
primary care, in terms of infrastructure (chapter 4) and NHS staff (chapter 5).  The 
infrastructure developments include increased hospital capacity, improved quality of 
catering and cleanliness, modernized primary care premises, and new equipment and 
IT systems.  The personnel developments include major increases in numbers of 
doctors, nurses and other professionals, more attention to conditions of service, and 
additional training and international recruitment. 
 
Central to the success of the Plan will be the performance management systems put in 
place to ensure that its objectives are secured (chapter 6).  Numerous initiatives are 
described which seek to ensure that the new arrangements are successful, some of 
which were in place before the writing of the Plan.  Some of the more important 
performance management instruments are: 
 
−  extended use of national standards of care, through the National Service 
Frameworks for key conditions and diseases; 
−  further development of guidance on best treatments and interventions by the 
National Institute for Clinical Excellence; 
−  creation of a Modernization Agency to help localities redesign local services in 
line with local patients' needs and to identify and promulgate good practice; 
−  further development of the Performance Assessment Framework as the central 
instrument for measuring success; 
−  a comprehensive programme of inspection by the Commission for Health 
Improvement; 
−  a ‘traffic light’ system for categorizing the success with which local NHS 
organizations are securing national objectives; 
−  a progressive decentralization of NHS decision-making, with a system of ‘earned 
autonomy’, under which central intervention in local activity will be in inverse 
proportion to success; 
−  a National Health Performance Fund to be used to reward local achievement, with 
local discretion in its use increasing as more autonomy is earned; 
−  creation of a Modernization Board to advise the Secretary of State on 
implementation. 
 
Health care in England is delivered by the NHS, social care by local authorities.  This 
institutional division of responsibilities has historically given rise to difficulties in 
delivering appropriate care to certain vulnerable groups, most notable older people.  
In Chapter 7, major new investment in ‘intermediate care’ is proposed, which will 
seek to provide appropriate care outside acute hospitals for older people in need of 4   The NHS plan: an economic perspective 
 
support, rehabilitative, recuperative and home care services.  The Plan puts in place 
new incentives for closer partnership, in the form of a national performance fund for 
social service authorities to reward joint working with the NHS.  Provision is made 
for more formal integration of health and social care by allowing the creation of joint 
health and social care purchasing organizations (to be known as ‘care trusts’) when 
local agencies deem this appropriate. 
 
The contracts under which most NHS doctors work stem from the arrangements put in 
place when the NHS was created in 1948, and are perceived to contain some serious 
lacunae and perverse incentives. Chapter 8 proposes major changes to the contractual 
arrangements of doctors working for the NHS.  For general practitioners, it proposes a 
major expansion of the Personal Medical Services scheme, under which GPs are paid 
on the basis of meeting locally agreed quality standards, rather than on the basis of 
activity, as under the traditional GP contract.  In the same way, the Plan signals a 
major attempt to realign the incentives and rewards for senior hospital doctors, in the 
form of a radically revised contract.  Annual appraisal will become mandatory, and 
the clinical governance arrangements signalled in the earlier White Paper will 
reinforce an emphasis on clinical quality.  An attempt is made to tackle the potential 
conflict of interest of NHS hospital doctors also undertaking private work by 
suggesting that no such private work will be permitted for the first seven years of a 
consultant's career.  In a similar vein, a serious attempt will be made to align rewards, 
in the form of bonus payments and salary progression, with NHS objectives.  Doctors 
renouncing private work will be eligible for larger rewards. 
 
Contractual details are less problematic for non-medical NHS staff.  The Plan 
therefore directs its attention towards more flexible working arrangements by 
challenging traditional professional boundaries for nurses and other professions. It 
proposes a major investment in professional and leadership skills (Chapter 9).  
 
A perennial criticism of the NHS is the scant opportunity it offers for patient choice, 
patient empowerment or more general citizen involvement.  A range of initiatives to 
address this issue are proposed in Chapter 10.  They include: 
 
−  reforms to procedures and information availability to make it easier for patients to 
change their GPs; 
−  a major increase in the use of pre-booked dates for hospital inpatient and 
outpatient care; 
−  a range of more comprehensive and thorough mechanisms to investigate adverse 
events; 
−  a patient advocacy service and ‘patients' forum’ based in every NHS trust; 
−  rights of redress in a new NHS Charter; 
−  increased use of patient satisfaction surveys and feedback; 
−  financial rewards for trusts based on results of the National Patients Survey; 
−  increased public and local government scrutiny of NHS organizations. 
 
The NHS is the dominant supplier of health care in the UK.  The private sector is 
nevertheless significant in some parts of the country and for some treatments.  
Traditionally the NHS has purchased very little care from non-NHS providers.  
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providers, which makes provision for increased cooperation in the fields of elective 
care, critical care and intermediate care.  The particular focus of the concordat will be 
the reduction of inpatient waiting times and the relief of the traditional winter 
inpatient bed crisis in the NHS.   
 
Long NHS waiting times are addressed in Chapter 12.  This makes provision for 
substantial reductions in maximum waiting times for access to GPs, accident and 
emergency treatment, outpatient appointments and elective inpatient treatment.  For 
example, the maximum time for inpatient elective surgery is to be reduced from its 
current level of 18 months to six months by 2005, and eventually to 3 months.  A 
major increase in the use of booked appointments is also planned. 
 
The Government's public health priorities, originally set out in the White Paper 
Saving lives: our healthier nation, are reaffirmed in Chapter 13 [3].  Strategies to 
address health inequalities include redirection of resources to deprived areas, a range 
of initiatives aimed at children, a smoking cessation programme, and promotion of 
partnerships with non-NHS agencies.  Chapter 14 describes specific strategies and 
targets to address the clinical priorities of cancer, heart disease and mental illness.  
Chapter 15 addresses services for older people, most specifically long term care and 
the problematic interface between health and social care.  Although a range of new 
initiatives are announced, the Plan does not remove the means tested user charges for 
social care and accommodation sought by some commentators.   
 
The plan is replete with specific actions and targets.  It acknowledges that many 
changes - most especially relating to the recruitment and training of staff - will have 
to be incremental, and adopts a ten year horizon for phasing in new arrangements in 
many areas.  The Plan will be financed by a staged increase in the real resources 
available to the NHS.  A series of task forces will be responsible for its 




The Plan is in many respects a remarkable document.  The NHS has long been the 
jewel in the crown of Labour Party policy, so the frank admission of shortcomings set 
out in Chapter 2 represents an unusually fundamental public reappraisal.  Relying on 
large, albeit unscientific, surveys of public and staff, it pulls few punches.  The 
question such criticism raises is whether the fundamental structure of the NHS is now 
inappropriate.  The Plan’s analysis and rejection of alternative insurance arrangements 
to general taxation is comprehensive and cogent.  However, the Plan does not 
explicitly address possible changes to structure on the delivery side.  The system of 
general practice and geographically-based purchasers is not challenged.  Although 
there is recognition of the increased importance of intermediate care, hospitals remain 
the central focus of secondary care organization.  There are some moves towards 
closer integration between health and social care, but the split of responsibilities 
between NHS and local government remains largely in place.  It may well be the case 
that such structural arrangements are indeed appropriate, but the decision to take them 
as given circumscribes the scope of the Plan.  There is a clear need for periodic debate 
on such institutional arrangements.  However, we do not propose to challenge them in 6   The NHS plan: an economic perspective 
 
this paper, and our comments assess the Plan within the existing structural framework 
of the NHS.  
 
The key question to be addressed is: in terms of NHS objectives, will the Plan result 
in the best possible use of NHS resources over the long term?  In principle, economic 
evaluation of the Plan should probably seek to answer this cost-effectiveness 
question.  In practice, there is not enough evidence on which to make such a 
judgement.  For most aspects of the Plan, the best that we can do is to offer some 
judgement as to whether the new arrangements are likely to help move towards 
desired objectives – that is, we shall generally comment on effectiveness rather than 
cost-effectiveness. In this context it is consistent to seek to evaluate the plan in terms 
of the six domains of performance embodied in the Performance Assessment 
Framework (PAF), the central performance measurement instrument in the New NHS 
[4].  The domains are: 
health improvement: 
 
−  fair access; 
−  effective delivery; 
−  efficiency; 
−  the patient / carer experience; 
−  health outcomes of NHS care. 
 
Where possible, we try to do this.  In doing so, we are not necessarily claiming that 
the PAF embraces all possible aspects of outcome relevant to the NHS.  And we 
would certainly take issue with the relevance, quality and appropriateness of many of 
the performance indicators that are currently included in the PAF (shown in Table 2).  
However it is hard to dispute in broad terms the importance of all six domains to any 
evaluation of NHS performance.  
 
We now discuss the Plan in the context of seven topics on which economic analysis 
may have a distinctive insight to offer:  
 
−  investment; 
−  information; 
−  labour markets; 
−  the independent sector; 
−  waiting times; 
−  performance management; 
−  patient and carer responses. 
 
Investment 
Central to the Plan is the notion of investment, in both physical and human capital.  
The NHS has traditionally been weak in this area.  Capital planning and capital 
investment have not traditionally been seen as managerial priorities in the NHS.  
Rather, the capital planning preoccupation in recent years has been with the 
implementation of Private Finance Initiative (PFI) schemes.  The pattern of major 
capital investment has therefore been driven by the extent to which schemes can be 
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Table 2: The Performance Assessment Framework 
 I. Health improvement
1_i  Deaths from all causes (for people aged 15-64)  
1_ii  Deaths from all causes (for people aged 65-74)  
1_iii  Cancer registrations 
1_iv  Deaths from malignant neoplasms 
1_v  Deaths from all circulatory diseases 
1_vi  Suicide rates  
 II. Fair access 
2_i  Surgery rates 
2_ii  Size of inpatient waiting list per head of population (weighted)  
2_iii  Adults registered with an NHS dentist  
2_iv  Children registered with an NHS dentist 
2_v  Early detection of cancer  
 III. Effective delivery of appropriate health care
3_i  Disease prevention and health promotion  
3_ii  Early detection of cancer  
3_iii  Inappropriately used surgery 
3_iv  Surgery rates 
3_v  Acute care management 
3_vi  Chronic care management  
3_vii  Mental health in primary care  
3_viii  Cost effective prescribing  
3_ix  Discharge from hospital 
 IV. Efficiency 
4_i  Day case rate  
4_ii  Length of stay in hospital (case-mix adjusted) 
4_iii  Unit cost of maternity (adjusted)  
4_iv  Unit cost of caring for patients in receipt of specialist mental health 
4_v  Generic prescribing 
 V. Patient / carer experience of the NHS
5_i  Patients who wait less than 2 hours for emergency admission (through 
5_ii  Patients with operation cancelled for non-medical reasons   
5_iii  Delayed discharge from hospital for people aged 75 or over  
5_iv  First outpatient appointments for which patient did not attend  
5_v  Outpatients seen within 13 weeks of GP referral  
5_vi  % of those on waiting list waiting 12 months or more  
 VI. Health outcomes of NHS health care
6_i  Conceptions below age 16  
6_ii  Decayed, missing and filled teeth in five year old children 
6_iii  Adverse events / complications of treatment  
6_iv  Emergency admissions to hospital for people aged 75 and over  
6_v  Emergency psychiatric re-admission rate 
6_vi  Infant deaths  
6_vii  Survival rates for breast and cervical cancer  
6_viii  Avoidable deaths  
6_ix  In-hospital premature deaths 
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It is not at all clear how the continued reliance on PFI for major capital schemes will 
affect the ability of the NHS to meet the objectives and targets of the PAF.  The 
Treasury is more willing to approve major capital schemes if they are financed by PFI 
than if they are financed by public sector borrowing.  Therefore, in an aggregate 
sense, PFI will contribute to the relaxation of physical capacity constraints that have 
affected achievement in several PAF domains.  But there is no guarantee that 
continued use of PFI will lead to an optimal use of capital resources.  It will moreover 
be virtually impossible to undertake meaningful economic assessments of PFI 
schemes as they are governed by a high degree of commercial confidentiality.   
 
The ‘Capital and Capacity’ Task Force will be overseeing capital developments 
associated with the Plan.  Its objective should be to secure a pattern of capital 
investment which will yield maximum benefits in terms of the PAF.  Rather than 
seeking out some concept of ‘fair shares’ of capital investment, the priority should be 
to identify the capacity constraints that impose the largest opportunity costs on the 
NHS, regardless of where they occur.  Pursuing this might in principle result in quite 
markedly skewed patterns of investment.  Investigation of the capital investment 
consequences of the Plan represents an interesting research issue. 
 
In the same way, the implied investment in staff will require the introduction of major 
new instruments, such as a Leadership Centre for Health, which are largely a step in 
the dark.  It will be imperative that proper evaluation of such initiatives is undertaken, 
again in terms of their long run contribution to the six PAF domains.  There is a 
strong case for controlled experimentation of alternative models of staff development, 
and there will be a need to change arrangements organically as evidence on ‘what 
works’ begins to emerge. 
 
Labour markets 
Some of the most interesting economic issues raised by the Plan concern the new 
arrangements for doctors and other professionals.  Underlying the proposed reforms is 
a desire to realign personal and team incentives in accordance with the objectives of 
the NHS.  Amongst general practitioners, the Plan signals a desire to move away from 
the straitjacket imposed by the traditional GP contractual arrangements, and instead to 
base incentives on local priorities.  The NHS is currently experimenting with locally 
developed GP contracts, in the form of the Personal Medical Services scheme.  The 
intention is that PMS should offer more flexible arrangements which are sensitive to 
local requirements.  Some areas of the country have embraced PMS with enthusiasm.  
Again, the extent to which it secures improved performance along the PAF domains 
will need to be evaluated.  And there will be a need to assess and disseminate good 
practice. 
 
The ‘toxic’ incentives implicit in the traditional NHS hospital consultants contract 
have been a long-standing source of concern.  The Plan proposes a radical revision, in 
which attention will focus on the removal of the potential conflict of interest that 
arises for NHS consultants undertaking private practice.  In addition, the current focus 
of consultant bonus schemes is a vague concept of ‘distinction’.  There is a clear need 
to realign this towards some measure of contribution to NHS objectives, as reflected 
in the PAF.  However, doing so will be a delicate undertaking, particularly if the 
notion of performance bonuses is to be extended to other professions.  CHE Discussion Paper 186   9 
Modelling the incentives operating on NHS consultants and their associated 
behaviour appears to be prime material for traditional microeconomic analysis.  There 
is also scope for examining less conventional models of clinical performance, which 
incorporate concepts such as leadership, trust and organizational culture on 
performance.  Here the scope for ‘real’ trials and experiments seems limited.  
However, there may be scope for more creative exploration of alternatives using 
devices such as laboratory experiments.  
 
Central to the success of the Plan will be the extent to which the required increases in 
numbers of doctors, nurses and other professionals materialise.  To what extent will 
increased financial rewards, better working conditions and more attention to career 
development improve the ability of the NHS to recruit and retain professional staff?  
In principle, such labour market analysis should be highly amenable to economic 
analysis, but there is in practice little evidence on which to judge this aspect of the 
Plan.   
 
The independent sector 
To observers from overseas, the increased use of the independent sector implied by 
the concordat with private sector providers is likely to appear to be a very modest 
step.  However, it represents a major ideological departure for the political party that 
introduced a public sector NHS, and its symbolic importance should not be 
underestimated.  The principal focus of the concordat in the acute sector is initially 
likely to be where there is private sector slack capacity.  In principle, one would 
expect the NHS to use the private sector selectively only when marginal financial cost 
of private treatment is low relative to the marginal financial cost of treating in NHS 
facilities.  However, the myriad targets, rewards and penalties implicit in the PAF 
mean that in some localities the opportunity cost to managers of not using available 
private sector capacity may have little to do with relative financial costs of treatment.     
 
There is an important distinction to be made between short-term use of excess private 
capacity and planned long-term use of private sector acute facilities.  In the long-term, 
if the private sector invests in and maintains capacity to treat NHS patients, it will 
have to charge prices no lower than long-run average costs.  In the past we would 
have expected NHS long-run average cost to be lower than that in the private sector.  
Now, however, with virtually all new NHS hospital capacity financed by PFI, it is not 
clear what the relative costs of public and private capacity will turn out to be. 
 
One issue that makes it difficult to predict the effect of the concordat on NHS 
performance is uncertainty over the effects on the cost of private treatment and the 
capacity to treat NHS patients if the proposed changes to the consultants contract go 
ahead. Restricting the number of NHS consultants who are allowed to do private work 
could reduce the effective capacity of the private sector even if there are empty 
private beds (labour, not capital, becomes the constraint).  If a shortage of consultants 
leads the private sector to bid up the rates it pays doctors for undertaking private 
work, then the cost to the NHS of using private capacity will rise. 
 
Numerous other issues relating to patient outcome are raised by the increased use of 
the independent sector.  Again, the key touchstone of success must be whether the 
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substantial scope for microeconomic analysis of the various principal/agent 
relationships which may exist between the public and private sector.  Much will 
depend on the extent to which the numerous instruments of quality control being 
introduced into NHS providers are applied equally to private providers used by the 
NHS.  The framework for monitoring quality of NHS health care was developed 
before the concordat and when DH policy was to maintain a rigid distinction between 
the public and private sectors. Consequently legislation to create a regulatory 
framework for the private sector was separate from the legislation to create a 
regulatory framework for the public sector.  The concordat introduces some urgency 
in merging the regulatory mechanisms so that one standard of quality control will 
exist whether an NHS patient is treated by an NHS Trust or in the private sector. 
 
In other parts of the public sector, use of private contractors has often been seen as a 
useful expedient to circumvent public sector constraints, such as national employment 
conditions or capital investment constraints.  If the concordat is used in this way, 
because unnecessary contractual or investment constraints prevent the NHS from 
operating efficiently, then we would suggest that the constraints themselves could be 
relaxed, without recourse to the expedient of using outside private contractors.  If the 




From an economic perspective, perhaps the single most important investment area is 
information.  Almost all economic models of individual and organizational behaviour 
suggest that outcomes are enhanced as the information base gets stronger.  Of course 
such improvements in outcome must be balanced against the additional costs of new 
information sources.  However, the NHS does not historically appear to have seized 
the opportunities offered by information technology developments, and has a tradition 
of underachievement in this area.   
 
A 1998 policy paper Information for Health set out a bold vision for NHS information 
systems [5].  However, implementation appears to have been patchy and slow.  The 
vision for the NHS information base is that the individual longitudinal electronic 
health record (EHR) should form its core.  This should be capable of capturing the 
patient experience across all relevant institutions whenever health or social care is 
consumed.  The core function of the information base should be to provide for 
patients and staff a ‘real time’ resource which is an essential element in the delivery 
of patient care.  For this to be effective, staff will have to recognise that accurate and 
timely updating of an individual’s record is an intrinsic part of the patient’s care. 
 
High quality information is essential if the Plan’s objectives are to be achieved 
because: 
 
−  it makes a central contribution to communication between patients, NHS 
professional staff, managers, board members, other organisations and the general 
public; 
−  it can help patients make effective use of health care resources; 
−  it can enhance the capacity of all front line staff to deliver effective and efficient 
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−  it serves as the basis for organisations to optimize delivery of the services under 
their control; 
−  it plays a central role in the individual performance appraisal process; 
−  it plays a central role in quality assurance and benchmarking; 
−  it is the buttress of the Performance Assessment Framework; 
−  it can contribute to accountability at all levels within the NHS; 
−  it contributes to the development of good partnership relationships; 
−  it is a natural resource for evaluating innovations and identifying ‘what works’. 
 
The EHR should indicate the extent to which the care patients receive conforms to 
guidelines and expectations, and so good quality performance information, at any 
desired level of aggregation, should be a natural by-product of the information base.  
Given the control of front line staff over the collection of data, it will be imperative 
that the information should be capable of being audited and quality controlled.  The 
Audit Commission and CHI will have a crucial role in independent validation.  From 
an economic perspective, the key consideration is that investment in the information 
base is at an optimal level (allocative efficiency) and that the information it yields is 
used to best effect (technical efficiency). 
 
In the past the NHS has placed importance on the quality of financial data but little 
interest in the quality of other information.  In countries where the income of hospitals 
is partly dependent on patient coding and activity, the level of skill (and cost) of 
personnel producing and auditing the information is much higher than in the UK.  The 
Plan promises to put in place significant rewards and penalties for NHS organizations 
depending on how the ‘data’ suggest they are performing.  Trusts may therefore find 
it in their interests to invest more in the production of the relevant data.  Experience 
also suggests NHS units on the receiving end of these rewards and penalties may have 
an incentive to game the data, leading in turn to a need for more refined audit and data 
quality control measures.  Thus, if the Plan succeeds in changing professional 




The Plan’s concern with waiting times is inevitable, given the widespread public 
dissatisfaction with this aspect of the NHS, the poor performance relative to many 
other developed countries, and increasing evidence that long waiting may be having 
an adverse influence on health outcomes for some conditions.  This area of the Plan is 
extraordinarily ambitious.  Highly visible targets have been set, and it will be 
surprising if local managers do not view achievement of these targets as one of their 
highest priorities.  Therefore, despite protestations to the contrary, it is likely that 
elective surgery will remain the top priority of many NHS managers.  In terms of the 
PAF, the domain of fair access is likely to dominate. 
 
Whether the Plan’s waiting time ambitions are achievable is a matter for conjecture, 
although the chosen targets are likely to have been tested for feasibility.  A central 
area of uncertainty is the extent to which reduced NHS waiting times will stimulate 
demand for NHS care, as patients switch from private providers or choose to undergo 
a procedure where before they would have sought other forms of care.  Our estimates 12   The NHS plan: an economic perspective 
 
suggest that the ‘induced demand’ effect is likely to be modest, but this issue will 
undoubtedly be monitored carefully. 
 
The reduced NHS waiting times may have substantial knock-on effects throughout the 
health care system.  Private insurers have hitherto used NHS waiting as one of their 
prime marketing devices.  When an individual is not covered by private health 
insurance, NHS waiting time is often the crucial motivation for purchasing a 
procedure privately.  The NHS Plan is therefore likely to imply some reduction in 
demand for private health care, although econometric evidence suggests that any 
decline may be quite modest.  It will nevertheless be interesting to see how the private 
insurance and provider markets respond to this challenge. 
 
The targets for booked admissions may have important implications for hospital 
throughput.  In effect, a booked admission represents a fixed call on resources and 
reduces the volume of beds and theatre time available for other activity, such as 
emergencies.  Given random demand for such other services, managers are likely to 
seek to build in additional slack to the resources at their disposal.  One might 
therefore expect to see a lower level of throughput in acute NHS beds as a response to 
the increased use of booked admissions.  It is important to recognize that such 
reduced intensity of use may be an efficient response, and is part of the price that 
must be paid in order to increase the use of booked admissions whilst retaining a 
capacity to handle fluctuating emergency demand, most notably what have become 
known as ‘winter pressures’.  There may be a need to fine tune incentives in order to 
ensure that managers balance the competing demands of elective and emergency 
sector satisfactorily.  And the development of appropriate computerised booking 
systems which enable hospital bed managers to manage their resources efficiently 
would seem to be a priority.  
 
Performance management 
Successful management of performance is central to securing the objectives of the 
Plan.  The New NHS White Paper had already put in place a daunting panoply of 
performance management instruments, such as National Service Frameworks, the 
National Institute for Clinical Excellence, local Health Improvement Programmes, the 
Performance Assessment Framework, the Commission for Health Improvement and 
clinical governance arrangements [4].  We have discussed the broad economic issues 
surrounding these initiatives elsewhere.  The Plan fleshes out many of the details 
surrounding the new arrangements, and introduces some new instruments, notably the 
system of ‘traffic lights’ to indicate the performance status of NHS organizations; the 
establishment of a performance fund, with unfettered access conditional on traffic 
light status; and the establishment of the Modernization Agency to promulgate best 
practice in organization and delivery. 
 
The Plan shows a good awareness of many of the difficulties inherent in managing 
health care performance, most notably the dangers of centralization.  The rhetoric of 
the Plan suggests a willingness to let go of some of the reins of central control.  For 
example, the system of earned autonomy will give green light organizations lighter 
inspection burden and freedom from the attentions of the Modernization Agency.  
There is a recognition that – to be universally effective – performance targets must be 
tailored to the starting point of an organization, rather than be based on crude national CHE Discussion Paper 186   13 
standards.  There is (section 6.6) a recognition that ‘trust’ in frontline staff is a 
valuable asset that – if properly used – can yield considerable benefits.  And a large 
part of chapter 6 is given over to explaining increased devolution of powers from the 
centre.   
 
At the same time, most of the performance management instruments are intrinsically 
centralist in nature.  There is throughout the document a concern with the reduction in 
variations in all aspects of performance, and a desire to effect national standards 
wherever possible.  If crudely implemented, a system of national performance 
standards may be seriously dysfunctional, perhaps in the extreme leading managers 
and clinicians to seek out only congenial environments in which to work, in turn 
leading to recruitment difficulties in deprived areas and even greater disparities in 
many aspects of performance.  There is therefore a strong case for rewarding progress 
towards national standards in the light of the difficulty of the environment. 
 
Successful management of the tension between the twin concerns of national 
consistency and local discretion will be a crucial determinant of the Plan’s success.  
Excessive centralization is likely to lead to many of the well-documented 
dysfunctional outcomes associated with soviet-style management.  Excessive 
devolution may result in considerable scope for excusing poor performance and 
unacceptable variations.  This tension is reflected in the Plan.  For example, section 
6.19 indicates that efficiency targets will be based on ‘levels of service already being 
achieved by the best trusts’, whilst section 6.31 indicates that the Performance Fund 
will be used to ‘encourage year-on-year improvements regardless of different local 
starting points’.  These statements reflect a desire to search for targets which reflect a 
judicious mix of cross-sectional comparison with peers and continuous individual 
improvement.  If these sentiments are respected in implementation then there is a 
good prospect that the Plan’s ambitions might be realized.  However, the complexity 
of measuring, monitoring and implementing the different targets set in different ways 
– especially given the well-known shortcomings in NHS data – may produce a 
complex and unwieldy set of measures.  Progress in this area will therefore depend on 
the ability to improve data collection and recording methods as well as setting out a 
clear framework within which the various aspects of performance are drawn together. 
 
One issue highlighted by the opening paragraph in this section is the proliferation of 
agencies and initiatives to manage performance.  Will the NHS be overwhelmed with 
guidelines and inspections?  The model of performance management adopted by the 
Plan involves a great deal of duplication.  For example, regional offices of the NHS 
Executive are in principle already responsible for performance management, so why 
is there a need for an external inspectorate?  The answer is hinted at in the recent NHS 
document A service with a memory, which addressed the emergence of a series of 
high profile performance failures in the NHS [6].  The document adopted what it calls 
a ‘Swiss cheese’ model of accident causation, in which – for a hazard to be translated 
into a disaster – it needs to pass through a hole in each of a series of independent 
layers of cheese. 
 
In the context of the NHS, the cheese layers are the performance management 
instruments.  The intention is that each should act as a check on performance.  Their 
independence from each other is therefore a critically important aspect of the model, 14   The NHS plan: an economic perspective 
 
as without independence there is a much greater chance that the system becomes 
ineffective – the holes in the cheese become aligned.  Thus the apparent duplication in 
the Plan may be a deliberate attempt to avoid system failure.  Of course it comes at a 
price: the extra managerial costs associated with the additional layers of inspection.  It 
is difficult to envisage circumstances in which ‘the share of NHS spend on 
management costs will be cut’ (Plan paragraph 6.62), or indeed circumstances in 




In assessing the likely impact of the Plan, a key unknown is the response of patients 
and their carers.  Will the new concept of the ‘empowered’ patient lead to more 
assertive and increased levels of demand, or indeed a proliferation of legal actions?  
How will patients respond to the new booking procedures?  Will new routes of patient 
access, such as NHS Direct, increase or reduce demand for care?  Will patients in 
practice change GPs with increased regularity once performance information is made 
available?  How will targeted populations respond to the inequality initiatives set out 
in the Plan, and what are the implications for demand?   
 
The answers to many of these questions have crucial implications for the effectiveness 
of the Plan, most notably in the areas of health improvement, fair access and health 
outcomes of NHS care.  Yet there is a profound lack of evidence on which to base any 
judgement, and one must hope that appropriate measurement and evaluation is put in 




In drawing conclusions, it is worth considering whether the concept of a ‘plan’ is 
appropriate for an industry as complex as health care in which technology, 
expectations and external environment are changing so rapidly.  Is there a danger that 
the assumptions on which the Plan is based become quickly obsolete, rendering the 
Plan useless?  Planning has become unfashionable, and some spectacular large scale 
planning disasters have undoubtedly contributed to its fall from favour.  Hall [7] 
judges that the critical element in such failures are the lack of the plan’s robustness to 
unexpected developments, and the lack of consideration of behavioural responses to 
the plan.  So key yardsticks for assessing the durability of the NHS Plan should be the 
extent to which its conclusions are robust to the unexpected, and its attention to the 
likely responses of key individuals, most notably front line staff. 
 
In both respects the initial impression is favourable.  A major area of uncertainty to 
NHS planning has hitherto been the level of resources available.  However, the three 
year budgetary settlement for the NHS removes some elements of financial 
uncertainty.  Furthermore, there is throughout the Plan a recognition that key actors 
can respond in unexpected ways to new arrangements, and instruments have been 
proposed that – at least in principle – seek to accommodate such responses. 
 
The devil will be in the detail.  Will the precise implementation of the Plan, in the 
form of instruments as diverse as the new consultant contract, the inspection style of 
the Commission for Health Improvement, and local performance management CHE Discussion Paper 186   15 
processes, be able to make operational the lofty aspirations of the Plan?  There will be 
much hard work, imagination, testing, evaluation and analysis needed to ensure that it 
does.  Will ministers be prepared to wait for the longer-term aims to be addressed, or 
will attention remain on short-term objectives? Indeed, is long-term planning possible 
in an organization so vulnerable to short-term political imperatives? 
 
This paper has raised many questions in relation to the NHS Plan, and a potentially 
enormous research agenda.  The introduction of much of the Plan is supported by 
solid evidence.  Other elements must perforce be introduced in the absence of 
evidence, and are largely a step in the dark, so require careful evaluation.  And other 
elements reflect political imperatives rather than any evidence or theory.  However, 
the broad impression is that the Plan addresses in some form most of the key 
performance issues raised by modern systems of health care.  If it fails, the question 
must be asked: is a high quality, efficient, universal, comprehensive, publicly funded 
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